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ABSTRACT
Agency Theory deliberates the relationship between principals and
agents, and the agency problems that originate in information asym-
metries and goal conflicts. Through the lens of Agency Theory, with
mixed methods, I investigate the decisions about funding of theatre
organizations by governments, based on assessments by third par-
ties. In two settings “artistic quality” is the major determinant of
public support, to the detriment of criteria as participation, social
objectives, efficiency and entrepreneurship. I argue that, next to pre-
viously recognized principal-agent relationships between govern-
ments and theatres, and governments and panels, a third
relationship is very influential: between an arts field and panels.
KEYWORDS
Agency theory; content
analysis; econometric
analysis; panel
assessments; theater
Introduction
In many countries, governments are strongly involved in supporting the arts based on
the justifications that they are merit goods or generate positive externalities for society
(Musgrave 1959; Netzer 1978; Throsby 1982). A challenge that governments face when
developing support instruments relates to inducing organizations to comply with their
policy goals. According to Towse (2010), this is a principal-agent problem, where gov-
ernments (principals) must set up the right incentives to encourage arts organizations’
(agents) compliance with their goals. Strings are attached to arts funding (McDonald
and Harrison 2002) and, when seeking support, arts organizations are increasingly
required to make explicit what justifies their legitimacy (Herman 2019). At the same
time, government subsidies to the arts have, in recent years, declined in terms of total
contribution and contributions to individual organizations (Kirchner, Markowski, and
Ford 2007; Zan et al. 2012; Bertelli et al. 2014), augmenting the challenges for nonprofit
arts organizations (Arnold and Tapp 2003).
In many European countries, subsidies to arts organizations typically come in the
form of direct support as a lump sum grant (Schuster 1996). Owing to the fact that gov-
ernment agencies have increasingly limited funds to distribute and many organizations
request funding, a common practice of governments is to install selection procedures,
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executed by third parties of experts and/or peers. Because nonprofit arts organizations
are largely dependent on public funding, third-party decision makers gain power as
gatekeepers who control entry to an arts production environment and can exclude arts
producers from it (Zan et al. 2012). In this manner, such third-party assessments could
be manifestations of the power hierarchies that Bourdieu (1993) found to typifying sym-
bolic fields as the arts: a limited number of actors possess the ability to impose criteria
of evaluation, and thus the power to consecrate and eventually maximize the autonomy
of a field. Hence, a common outcome of those selection procedures is that well-estab-
lished organizations get repeatedly and disproportionally subsidized, at the expense of
new organizations and art forms that have not got their foot in the door (Towse 2010;
Zan et al. 2012).
In the present article, I study such a selection procedure through the lens of Agency
Theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976). I argue that the government (as principal) con-
fronts two agents: not only arts organizations (Towse 2010), but also the experts and/or
peers who execute the selection of arts organizations into the subsidy system (Trimarchi
2003). Because issues such as artistic quality are hard to evaluate, information problems
abound in the arts, which lie at the back of principal-agent problems (Towse 2010;
Jensen and Meckling 1976). Furthermore, state intervention involves dilemmas, goal
conflicts, and information asymmetries that can be expected when the evaluation crite-
ria of different parties do not align well and may be tacit or difficult to measure (Van
House and Childers 1994; Herman and Renz 2008; Turbide and Laurin 2009).
Recent empirical studies of the effectiveness of third-party assessment procedures in
the arts lead to diverging conclusions. For example, while scholars observe that, in par-
ticular settings, the decision-making processes on subsidizing the arts still appear to
“easily become enmeshed with political perspectives” (Shin and Kim 2018, 99), it is
equally found that the installment of third-party assessments mitigates the “association
between political factors and funding decisions” (Bertelli et al. 2014, 342). Also, while it
is evidenced that a narrow range of voices from a powerful cultural elite still put their
mark on decision making in the arts (Jancovich 2017), it is equally demonstrated that
the privileged positions in those assessments appear to have shifted from experts who
possess the capacity of aesthetic judgment to “those who can claim technical expertise”
in political (evidence-based) decision making (Lewandowska 2017, 11). All in all, sub-
sidy allocation by involving third parties is found to be characterized by “symbolic
mechanisms of power” between assessors and the government (D’Andrea 2017, 247)
and leading to “unanticipated outcomes and inconsistencies between rhetoric and con-
duct” (Zan et al. 2012, 76).
I study how government resources are assigned among diverse applicant organiza-
tions; i.e., the choices of funding (cf. Zan et al. 2012). Specifically, I examine to what
extent governments’ policy goals—effectuated in criteria—actually play a role (or not) in
the third-party assessments of theaters’ eligibility for subsidies.
A multi-method research methodology was implemented, consisting of content and
statistical analyses of the third-party assessments of theater in two geopolitical entities
in continental Europe: the Netherlands and the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium
(Flanders). A first step of this mixed-methods approach entailed a qualitative content
analysis of the third-party assessments of eighty-four Dutch and fifty-seven Flemish the-
ater organizations. In a second step, I scrutinized if these assessors consistently apply all
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government criteria to all of the applications. In a final step, I econometrically analyzed
the output of the first step, trying to find evidence for either narrative: do third parties,
in their assessments, strictly apply government criteria or do they at their own discre-
tion deviate from them?
The baseline of my findings is that quality-maximizers stand a greater chance of
receiving subsidies compared with attendance-maximizers or budget-maximizers
(Hansmann 1981). This means that even if governments may spell out objectives, the
arts organizations in the present study have no incentive to embrace government objec-
tives in the areas of participation, efficiency, and entrepreneurship. They prioritize artis-
tic objectives and are confirmed in this choice by the third parties that decide about
public funding.
By shedding a light on third-party assessments invoking agency, I elicit a behavioral
component within the subsidy allocation process. Other theoretical stances onto third-
party involvement in policy could advance the understanding of how arts funding
decisions are made as well. Being fundamental to public choice theory, principal-agent
analysis could serve to analyze politicians’ and bureaucrats’ behavior (at times self-
interested and motivated by other incentives than pursuing the public interest): seem-
ingly anomalous behavior could be explained by “regulatory capture” by special inter-
est groups such as the “cultural lobby” in the arts (Stigler 1971). Selection theory
(Wijnberg and Gemser 2000) deliberates how three ideal types of selectors (market,
peers, experts) are involved in value creation in competitive processes, particularly in
markets of symbolic goods such as the arts. This could be extended by considering
the role of a funding government that engages with peers and/or experts to make
selections. Crowding theory (Frey 1999), with its articulation of the motivations that
lead to particular behaviors, could also provoke a salient perspective on arts fund-
ing decisions.
Agency Theory: Goal heterogeneity and information asymmetry in
arts funding
The arts sector has been described as “a complex network that can be interpreted as a
combination of different principal-agent relationships” (Trimarchi 2003, 373).
Exchanges between principals (who determine tasks) and agents (who perform tasks)
can be subjected to goal conflicts and information asymmetries, which is the baseline of
Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976). On the one hand, many arts organizations
are nonprofit, with proper goals. According to Hansmann’s (1981) typology of nonprofit
orientations, many organizations are quality-maximizers who consider an audience as a
mere source of income that allows them to develop quality. Audience-maximizing
organizations choose the level of quality that maximizes net revenue and seek to reduce
ticket prices in order to attract still larger audiences. A third type are budget-maximiz-
ers, who simply seek to capitalize on the budgets they administer. On the other hand,
public authorities also hold goals, and seek to justify the distribution of resources in
line with those goals (Gray 2007). Throsby (1982, 246) has postulated that arts funding
decisions can be comprehended as “involving essentially two maximands: participation
rates, and the quality of the output.” To this day, the most prominent motives
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underlying public funding decisions on the (performing) arts boil down to these maxi-
mands, which have been labeled “arts provision” and “hegemony-distinction” (Feder
and Katz-Gerro 2012). The former emphasizes the responsibility of government to pro-
vide arts to all its citizens, including the underprivileged, and underwrites the ideals of
accessibility and the arts as a merit good (Netzer 1978); the latter prioritizes the
“excellence” or quality of the arts (Caust 2017; Lamont 2012).
At the operational level, policymakers determine the strings attached to public fund-
ing: they prescribe how arts organizations should behave in order to obtain it
(McDonald and Harrison 2002). These prescriptions are not always unequivocal; the
“vagueness” around the meaning of policy goals has been brought to the fore, as well as
the “gaps” in grant application processes (Caust 2017, 7). The conditions for public sup-
port have been found to be defined in terms of variables that can be easily observed,
such as capacity utilization (Krebs and Pommerehne 1995). Nonetheless, public author-
ities also inform their funding decisions by the intrinsic quality of an organization’s
provision (Schuster 1996) and outcomes rather than outputs (Wyszomirski 1998),
dimensions which are hard to define and difficult to measure. This has led scholars to
conclude that, compared with other areas of public intervention, arts funding entails
challenges that originate in the content and range of intervention, and the criteria
applied to justify funding decisions (Wyszomirski 1998; Mazza 2003).
In order to overcome substantive challenges and the asymmetrical distribution of
information, typical in principal-agent relationships, a system of third-party assessment
is often called into being. Proficient assessors then evaluate the performance of arts
organizations, a process which can take place for different reasons, including monitor-
ing, evaluating, and affecting their behavior (Schuster 1996). Panels often hold the
authority to decide on subsidy allocation. Lewandowska (2017) argues that expertise
has been installed at the heart of arts policy because of the increased pressures on
measurement by society, and that such expert power may have deep implications on
the nature of the arts’ provision. The decisions from these third parties can influence
the exchanges in the arts in different ways, because they can be variously reliable,
contingent upon these assessors’ (past) involvement in the arts (Trimarchi 2003). The
efficacy of third-party assessment systems has been questioned, as they embroil human
behavior that could be tainted by subjective biases, professional prejudices, self-inter-
est, resistance to change, and ideology (Bertelli et al. 2014; Jancovich 2017;
Lewandowska 2017). Worst-case scenario, “given the relevance of their evaluations for
the determination of the economic value of art products, collusion between agents
and critics/experts can occur, strengthening agents’ contractual power against princi-
pals, and introducing a further bias in the outcome of such complex exchanges”
(Trimarchi 2003, 375). If this happens, arts funding can emanate “as an ideological
apparatus, with a cultural policy that serves elite groups in articulating and guarantee-
ing their privileged position in society” (Feder and Katz-Gerro 2012, 374; Bourdieu
1984). A dominant role for an elite of experts in arts funding can lead to a substan-
tial detachment of public policy from the preferences of a community (Mazza 2003;
Lewandowska 2017). As such, arts policy may yield fertile grounds for stark tensions
between interests that are more artistic vis-a-vis those that are more social, while at
the same time it seeks to resolve them.
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The institutional setting
In the Netherlands and Flanders,1 most subsidies to arts organizations are allocated
through (quasi-) arms-length systems that rely on third-party assessments for selecting
cultural organizations and projects to be granted public means. Every four years, thea-
ters2 can submit an artistic plan that is assessed by a relatively autonomous panel of
national members considered proficient. The criteria against which the applications are
assessed originate in the ruling arts policy. Panelists know the criteria that they have to
apply, but are not instructed on how to interpret the criteria or on any prioritization of
criteria. Panelists make final decisions by consensus, in closed meetings, and are
accountable to other panelists only (cf. D’Andrea 2017). They write detailed and rea-
soned reports of the assessments of organizations’ plans against the criteria.
In the Netherlands, the arms-length Funds for the Performing Arts develops arts pol-
icy. In the post-crisis year of 2009, it came under the motto “more for less,” implying a
stringent selection of organizations to be supported, yet in combination with an increase
in the average subsidy. Theaters’ artistic plans were assessed against six criteria: (1) art-
istic quality (craftsmanship, originality, and expressive power); (2) profile and position;
(3) (inter)national reputation; (4) connectedness; (5) audience outreach; and (6) cultural
entrepreneurship (Table 1). In Flanders, the Arts Decree stipulated arts policy. If com-
pliant with some formal requirements (e.g., a minimum proportion of market income),
organizations were subjected to the third-party assessment that, in the period under
scope, involved a dozen criteria: those that were used in the Netherlands, complemented
with social value, collaborations, vision, realism, and feasibility (Table 2).
The Dutch panel consisted of eight members, all involved in one or more theaters,
either artistically or in a management role: an actor, a dramaturge, a director, one the-
ater programmer, three managers, and one head of finance. The twelve panelists in
Flanders were theater critics (four), programmers (three), theater scientists (two), a
scenarist, television producer, and museum director. Being acquainted with theater yet
not employed by a theater, the panel in Flanders was exemplary as an expert selection
system, while the Dutch panel was a peer selection system (Wijnberg and Gemser 2000;
D’Andrea 2017).
Table 1. The evaluation criteria for theater organizations in the Netherlands.
Criteria Content analysis (summaries) n %
Artistic quality craftsmanship, the skills of the team members, originality, the
artistic signature, the vision of the artistic leader, distinguished,
expressive power, it challenges the imagination, creation of
meaningful performances
84 100
Profile and position different, unique 84 100
(Inter)national reputation outreach, distribution, dispersal 36 43
Collaboration, networking
and the “chain idea”
the creation, production, programming and audience development,
exemplified by collaborations
51 61
Audience outreach audience development, education and marketing 54 64
Cultural entrepreneurship
and management
market income, an entrepreneurial attitude 42 50
Diversity and interculturality cultural diversity, the intercultural supply or program (part of
profile and position)
22 26
n ¼ Number of organizations to which the criterion is applied in the assessment.
% ¼ Proportion of organizations to which the criterion is applied in the assessment.
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Empirical investigation
Methodology and employed data
The multi-method research methodology applied in the present study reflects an
“explanatory sequential design” that includes a qualitative and quantitative data analysis
stage (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). Content analysis is applied to examine how pan-
els interpret the assessment criteria. Statistical analyzing techniques are used to assess if
the criteria actually matter to the panels’ decisions.
The data are the reports created by the panels of the eighty-four Dutch and fifty-
seven Flemish theater organizations that applied for a subsidy for the terms
2009–2012 and 2010–2013, respectively.3 Using two separate samples that bear sig-
nificant similarities (regarding the cultural policy system, theater traditions, language,
etc.) allows us to reflect on the singularities within each sample and patterns across
both samples. The samples represent the entire “population” of theater organizations
that applied for subsidies, and are sufficiently large to allow for statistical analyses,
yet not too outsized for content analysis. The reports contain a decision, and an
assessment of the applicant organization’s artistic plan against the criteria of the gov-
ernment. Using content analysis, researchers can analyze and quantify the presence
of certain themes within textual data (Krippendorff 1980). The criteria were the
Table 2. The evaluation criteria for theater organizations in Flanders.
Criteria Content analysis (summaries) n %
Artistic quality creations that are intriguing, innovative, strong, emotional,
beautiful, relevant, original; theater that is honest, authentic;
important, inventive, talented, devoted creators; a theater
language that is expressive, unique, original, important, strong;
devotion to the craft of theater; a dramaturgy that is strong/
poor; texts that are original, made accessible,
communicative, etc.
57 100
Profile and position a sharp/strong profile, unique position, special, coherent, (no
longer) relevant or unique, remarkable, original, obstinate,
having played a (pioneering) role, having been part of… , one
of the representatives of… , distinguishing, etc.
47 82
(Inter)national reputation spreading, dispersal, dissemination, international operations,
abroad, (limited) visibility, presence/absence (in specific
countries, in national theaters… ), touring (within a country,
around national theaters… ), traveling to, (inter)national
reputation, increase of attraction, disposing of a network of
European partners, mapping internationally, crossing regional/
national borders, etc.
53 93
Collaboration, networking and
the “chain idea”
collaboration, alliances, co-productions, synergies, network 52 91
Audience outreach target groups, audience, arts education, public relations, audience
recruitment/growth
49 86
Regional added value regional meaning/significance, regional recognition, radiance,
embeddedness, anchoring
28 49
Diversity and interculturality new Belgians, multicolored and multilingual environment, non-
Western cultures, diverse backgrounds
40 70
Social value social-artistic activities/dynamics, social importance, socially critical
and political themes/language/voice, social engagement
38 67
Long-term vision (lack of) vision, plans, policy 22 39
Realism (not) realistic 11 19
Feasibility (not) feasible 50 88
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starting point of the coding process by two researchers with personal and profes-
sional interests in theater production (including the author). We expected that panels
would use a domain-specific vocabulary to assess arts organizations and their pro-
duction, as in science, where notions such as “original,” “innovative,” “important,”
or “significant” have been found to express valuation (Guetzkow, Lamont, and
Mallard 2004); or for movies, where quality is expressed in terms of “subtlety,”
“realism,” “credibility,” “plausibility,” and “complexity” (Bielby, Moloney, and Ngo
2005). The first step was to recognize the manifestation of the criteria in these
reports. During this process, dictionaries were developed (summarized in Tables 1
and 2). The second step of the coding entailed a quantitative approach to content
analysis, by assigning numeric values to the content (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 2005). In
this manner, we generated two types of variables that were included in statistical
estimations: an outcome variable, and two sets of independent variables (Tables 3
and 4). The outcome variable is the funding decision, or the result of the panels’
assessment. In the Netherlands, the assessments lead to a plain positive or negative
judgment on each plan, which was coded into a dummy variable (1¼ positive;
0¼ negative). In Flanders, the panel’s assessments result in a range of values between
very poor and very good, which was coded as a 5-point Likert scale. Additionally,
the coding resulted in two sets of dummy variables for each organization. A first
dummy variable (x1) indicates the presence (1) or absence (0) in the report of the
assessment against a particular criterion; x1 thus expresses if the panel assesses an
organization in light of a specific criterion or not. A second dummy variable (x2)
expresses if the panel is positive about an organization against a criterion (1), or
negative or silent (0). A value of 1 for x2 can therefore be interpreted as a vindi-
cated reason for government support, whereas 0 implies that the panel is not con-
vinced of the organization’s qualities on a specific criterion or believes that it is not
worth mentioning in its assessment. One exception in the coding process was made:
the thicker descriptions of organizations’ artistic quality were coded on a scale of
five values.4 Control variables are purposely not included in the statistical models,
because the goal is not to explain or predict all of the different qualities on which
subsidy allocations are based; the goal is to test to what extent panels take into
account the prescribed criteria in their decisions.
Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and Spearman’s rho correlations among all variables in the
Netherlands.
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Independent variables
1 Artistic quality 2.51 .844 1.000
2 Position .33 .473 .528 1.000
3 Reputation .43 .498 .611 .340 1.000
4 Audience .66 .477 .356 .121 .309 1.000
5 Diversity .27 .446 .341 .220 .257 .262 1.000
6 Chain idea .63 .485 .102 .209 .195 .094 .117 1.000
7 Cultural entrepreneurship .35 .481 .406 .350 .290 .264 .045 .244 1.000
Dependent variable
8 Judgment .50 .503 .887 .597 .715 .463 .385 .253 .485 1.000
 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
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Results
The multi-method research entailed three stages. First, the qualitative content analysis
identifies panels’ application of the assessment criteria. The maximands that habitually
underlie arts funding decisions can be recognized: next to the quality of the output and
the quantity of participation (cf. Throsby 1982), also the quality of participation (includ-
ing diversity) and the quality of management are being assessed. The vocabulary of
both panels is partially similar and partially different (Tables 1 and 2): the (expert)
panel in Flanders uses more variation in its language (for example, in assessing artistic
quality), while the language of the Dutch (peer) panel is parsimonious and closer to the
original wording of the criteria. An organization’s profile and position are conscien-
tiously being considered in the assessments, which creates the impression that panels
perceive it as a responsibility to compose an artistically diverse landscape of comple-
mentary organizations. Additionally, in the Netherlands (not in Flanders), the panel
judges the trustworthiness of more than half of the applicants (n¼ 43). For example,
the Dutch panel has trust in a theater company that has progressed quickly, or in a new
artistic director. It also distrusts organizations, as illustrated by a typical quote:
[i]n its future plans, the company does not advance a clear vision on the artistic
development or the themes it would like to address. That is why the committee does not
have sufficient trust in the expected quality of the plays that the company wants to
produce in the upcoming years.
The second stage addressed how far panels apply government’s criteria, with counts
per criterion (reported in Tables 1 and 2). Although governments in the Netherlands
and Flanders put forward a list of criteria that applications have to meet, panels priori-
tize criteria. Each plan/organization is assessed on its artistic quality. All Dutch organi-
zations are assessed on their profile or position; in Flanders four out of five are. This
criterion is subject to different interpretations: organizations can have geographical,
unique, prominent, pioneering, or visible positions, and strong (important, remarkable
key players) or niche (innovative, pioneering) profiles. Related is reputation (past per-
formance), applied in ninety-one percent of the Flemish assessments. The criteria that
relate to the audience are regularly used, but not for the assessments of all organiza-
tions: diffusion (eighty-four percent in Flanders; sixty-four percent in the Netherlands),
diversity (sixty-nine percent in Flanders; twenty-six percent in the Netherlands), and
social value (sixty-six percent in Flanders). Management qualities, as a third pillar in the
funding decisions, remain in the background. In the Netherlands, only half of the
organizations are evaluated on their entrepreneurial qualities, while long-term vision
(thirty-eight percent) and realism of a growth path (nineteen percent) are underempha-
sized in the Flemish evaluations. In sum, artistic quality and reputation (based on past
performance) are at the center of panelists’ attention, to the detriment of qualities more
related to the actual content of the application and to future plans. This is a finding in
line with Gorman (2007) and Guetzkow, Lamont, and Mallard (2004), who highlight
similar tendencies in evaluations in science.5
In the third stage, I examined the actual determinants of arts funding decisions.6
Statistical estimations can elicit whether panels invoke in their decisions all of the gov-
ernment’s criteria. In theory, this should be the case, because the funding bodies present
the criteria as a non-hierarchical and non-exclusive list that applicants all need to
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address. The expected estimates would then be significant and of a similar magnitude
for all variables included.
For the analysis of the Dutch data, a multiple logistic regression model was run to
test the probability of a positive assessment by the panel as a function of the govern-
ment’s criteria. In order to overcome a separation problem with the variable “artistic
quality” (a result of the predictableness of the outcome value (1 or 0) for almost each
value of the independent variable; see the Online Appendix), a corrective method was
applied (Firth 1993; Ploner et al. 2010). Estimates are reported in Table 5. Only the
positive effect of artistic quality on the outcome decision is significant up to the 0.001
level; the effect of reputation is just below the threshold level for significance of 0.05; no
other variable has a significant effect.
The situation in Flanders was tested with an ordinal logistic regression model, an
extension of the simple logistic regression model adequate for analyses when the out-
come variable comes on a Likert scale. Remember that panels do not decide in terms of
pass/fail, but assign a value ranging between “very poor” and “very good.” The model
estimates the probability of membership in a particular category, based upon values for
Table 6. Ordinal logistic regression for the Flemish data.
Ordinal logistic regression n¼ 57
Variables Logit
Treshold (decision ¼ 1) 3.963
Treshold (decision ¼ 2) 0.618
Treshold (decision ¼ 3) 2.319
Treshold (decision ¼ 4) 6.149
Artistic quality 11.669
Profile and position 2.373
(Inter)national reputation 1.166
Collaboration and networking 0.313
Audience outreach 0.327
Regional added value 0.485
Diversity and interculturality 0.367
Social value 0.558
Long-term vision 0.797
Realism 1.796
Feasibility 0.918
Chi2 ¼ 83.561.
Pearson 108.326; df 209 (P¼ 1.000).
pseudo R2: Cox and Snell ¼ 0.7630; Nagelkerke ¼ 0.8090. p < .05; p < .01; p < .001.
Table 5. Multiple logistic regression for Dutch sample.
Multiple logistic regression n¼ 84
Variables B
Constant 7.920
Artistic quality 8.740
Profile and position 1.875
(Inter)national reputation 2.393
Chain idea 1.183
Audience outreach 1.780
Cultural entrepreneurship 0.612
Diversity and interculturality 0.435
Likelihood ratio ¼ 90.749; df ¼ 7.
Wald ¼ 22.091; df ¼ 7.p < .05; p < .01; p < .001.
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the independent variable in relation to values of the discrete thresholds of the depend-
ent variable (from 1 to 5) (Cohen et al. 2003). Some zero cell counts were present, with
symptoms similar to data separation, which occur when the dependent variable is
invariant for a value of a categorical independent variable. However, if a pattern under-
lying the values can be assumed to fill in the blanks, and if the major concern of the
analysis is the overall relationship between a set of independent variables and a depend-
ent variable rather than obtaining individual values (as is the case), it is suggested that
the results are accepted, only with some uncertainty about the coefficient values
(Menard 2002). The estimates of the ordinal logistic model are reported in Table 6.
Three variables appear to have significant positive effects on the outcome of the assess-
ments: artistic quality, position, and realism.7
Discussion
Third-party assessments installed by governments judge the worthiness of applicants to
receive public funding in the arts. The empirical analyses show the predominance of cri-
teria that reflect quality and reputation, and the redundancy of criteria that reflect social
objectives and efficiency (feasibility, collaboration, realism, entrepreneurship, and the
integration in a production chain). Governments may expect arts organizations to break
down the barriers in society and to engage with access maximization, in line with the
merit of a good idea. However, panels that decide on grant allocation are inclined to
prioritize artistic quality, regardless of their composition of peers or experts. In Flanders
and the Netherlands, a focus on the artistic side rather than the social side of theater is
not unexpected. Between 1980 and 2000, Flemish theater gained a strong artistic reputa-
tion, while attendance declined (Werck and Heyndels 2007). Between 1965 and 2002,
the number of theater performances in the Netherlands doubled while participation
rates dropped by forty percent (van Klink 2005), which suggests that the maximand was
the artistic supply.
The importance of the findings lies primarily in the framing of an assessment proced-
ure as developed by one party—government—yet executed by a third party—a panel. In
the following, I discuss whether experts and peers can be expected to be loyal agents of
the government (amending its logic), or rather appear as defenders of the interests of
the arts world (prioritizing this logic).
Agency problems in arts funding
Agency Theory postulates that when the desires or goals of a principal and an agent
conflict, and when it is difficult for the principal to verify what the agent is actually
doing, agency problems can arise (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Arts funding decisions
enact distinct agency relationships: a principal (government) is conducive to supporting
several agents in the performance of a task (theaters) (Towse 2010), the selection of
whom is executed by yet another agent (panels) (Trimarchi 2003).
First, central governments, as in the Netherlands and Flanders, engage in subsidy
relationships with nonprofit arts producers for providing a cultural supply. The goals of
governments as principals and theaters as agents may not just be conflicting and mani-
fold, but policy goals are at times unclear and unstable. To start with, there are already
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tensions within an arts policy that seeks to foster the quality of the artistic production
and a more social culture policy aimed at promoting participation (Gray 2007).
Policymakers rarely, if ever, succeed in bridging the gap between these two goals, let
alone in developing adequate instruments that serve to link these objectives (van Klink
2005). This political problem is passed onto nonprofit arts producers on the lookout for
subsidies: by imposing criteria on their operations that simultaneously address quality,
social goals, and entrepreneurship, governments confront arts producers with many,
and possibly conflicting, requirements. As those organizations root within an arts com-
munity that is typified by a strong commitment to shared artistic values, they allegedly
prioritize the quality of their creations. As such, the imperatives of the government—
advocating the increase of social welfare but impregnated by control mechanisms and
efficiency concerns—and those of the arts community—advocating the persistence of
being able to advance a high-quality artistic offer and the status of its members—may
be hard to reconcile. This is the first condition leading to an agency problem.
Furthermore, in the absence of a market test, arts organizations tend to accrue new
imperatives without discontinuing other activities, which is a manifestation of goal
accretion, found to be typical for nonprofit and public sector organizations (Van House
and Childers 1994). At the basis of such behavior may lie phenomena that were identi-
fied in the Netherlands: policy inflation, or the constant renewal or rephrasing of policy
aims because of the fact that, every four years, new politicians seem reluctant to endure
the work of their predecessors; and process inflation, or the increasing bureaucratization
and complexity of policy processes for the sake of transparency (van Klink 2005).
Adequately monitoring arts-developing agents then becomes a challenge.
In the second principal-agent relationship between governments and third-party
assessors, an agency problem is also present because of goal conflicts and the lack of
transparency of the procedures. Although governments set the parameters for granting
decisions, our analyses clearly show that the actual assessments deviate from these pre-
scriptions. I suggest that panels have a dual commitment to both the government that
installed them and the artistic community that counts on them. Our case may be illus-
trative of an instance where professionals “lay successful claim to normative dimensions
of political processes” (Townley 1997, 280) by creating the impression of taking into
account many of the principal’s criteria (step 2 of the analysis), whereas only a subset
of those criteria actually matter in the funding decisions (step 3). Because of their artis-
tic commitments, panels write subsidy assessments that more resemble justifications ex
post, based on the previous realizations of arts community members and centered on
reputation and trust, than real assessments of an organization’s future plan against a
bundle of criteria (cf. the Oppenheim effect; Gorman 2007). Yet, this paradox may not
be clear to the principal.
The result is that a third agency relationship dominates: panels act as agents of the
art world. While panels (should) formally act to serve the interest of their contractual
principal (government), in practice they operate as hidden agents of the art world by
making decisions supportive to its institutional logic (Friedland and Alford 1991). That
is, the assessments apply the few quality-based criteria deemed important by a strong
arts community, and trust, or “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions
of another party (… ) irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”
(Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995, 719). As an emotional expression of worthiness,
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trust is invoked in over half of the Dutch assessments and strongly correlates to arts
funding decisions (r¼ 0.80). All of this suggests that panels serve the interests of the art
world and operate as gatekeepers that funnel state money to arts producers according
to the art world’s logic rather than that of government (Feder and Katz-Gerro 2012).
Conclusion, limitations, and implications
Although governments may try to impose concerns for quality, efficiency, entrepreneur-
ship, attendance, and the inclusion of diverse groups on theaters, I reveal that such a
bundle of policy goals are not at all times met as a result of ineffective procedures that
involve agents with logics different from that of principals. Based on qualitative and
quantitative content analyses, followed by a statistical estimation, I examined to what
extent third-party assessments of subsidy applications take into account the criteria of
governments. Such a behavioral approach to third-party assessments in subsidy alloca-
tion brings to the fore that panels endorse the art for art’s sake principle (Caves 2000)
in theater, while agency problems arise as a consequence of goal conflicts and informa-
tion asymmetries between all parties involved (governments, panels, and theater pro-
ducers). I argue that the relationship between panels and arts organizations can be
considered as another principal-agent relationship, next to the ones that have been iden-
tified before, between governments and theaters (Towse 2010) and governments and
panels (Trimarchi 2003).
A limitation of this study may be that my analysis provides just a snapshot of arts
funding decisions in a given context and time. Other recent studies endorse that panels’
(positive) biases and prejudices are not exceptional (Lewandowska 2017) and that previ-
ous merits matter a lot (Zan et al. 2012). The fact that the findings are similar for two
distinct settings increases their external validity and suggests that the phenomenon may
apply elsewhere as well. However, the findings stand in contrast with recent research in
Australia, where the “quality of the arts practice and the track record of the company”
were deemed less important than a good business plan (Caust 2017, 8), or in Canada,
where the peer review process was found to be shaped by government’s economic argu-
ments (D’Andrea 2017). The diverging findings across the aforementioned studies may
actually substantiate that principal-agent relationships are at play and indicate either
procedural or institutional differences across settings and countries.
A more fine-grained understanding of the origins of agency problems could benefit
from including the roles of embedded agency and the situated nature of social action
(as deliberated in the institutional logics perspective) in the analysis of principal-agent
relationships. While the government and the professions have been identified as the pri-
mary shapers of institutional forms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), the logics that such
powerful actors attain may be distinct, but still able to co-exist (Goodrick and Reay
2011). When panels, in their assessments, seem to meticulously take into account gov-
ernment’s objectives, the procedure creates the impression that a professional and a
state logic are not in conflict. Yet, my statistical analyses reveal that artistic quality is
the only significant determinant of panels’ decisions, in line with the logic of the artistic
community. As such, an Agency Theory lens can increase the understanding of how
agents navigate institutional complexity by engaging in efforts to manage goal conflicts
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and reshape the logics in their environments (Greenwood et al. 2011; Thornton, Ocasio,
and Lounsbury 2012). In the opposite direction, a discrepancy between two institutional
logics may provoke the exposed inefficiencies in the arts funding process, and lead to
agency problems. Taken together, one theoretical implication that arises from this study
is the need for situating principal-agent relationships at a field level, which opens the
door for the inclusion of an institutional logics perspective on the social relationships,
procedures, and behaviors in artistic settings.
Practical implications that emerge from this study relate to the undesirable conse-
quences of agency in arts funding. Incumbent organizations are privileged by the
repeated allocation of funding, while first-time submitters are put at a disadvantage,
which could eventually hamper innovations (Zan et al. 2012; Caust 2017; D’Andrea
2017). Additionally, the social function of the arts, including its potential to attenuate
social inequality, is cast aside by those grant allocators who prioritize artistic quality.
This study establishes that those actors who control the key functions of the system set
the cognitive and technical norms for artistic production, on the basis of which they
allocate resources or “rewards” (Crane 1976; Bourdieu 1993). In the funding system
described here, the ability of governments to reach their objectives is heavily affected by
the way in which procedures are carried out in practice (Zan et al. 2012). The mere rec-
ognition of third-party assessments being administrative processes and procedures that
involve “boundedly rational human decision makers” (Woronkowicz et al. 2019, 364;
D’Andrea 2018), who rely on special interests and heuristics related to prior knowledge
(Gorman 2007), could already lead to overcoming procedural weaknesses and optimiz-
ing arts funding systems.8
Notes
1. Cultural policy in Belgium is organized at the community/regional level, hence the choice
for Flanders.
2. In this institutional setting, these included theater houses and touring companies.
3. Shared with the researcher upon request.
4. A value of ADUL ADM(J) ¼ 0.43 for the Average Deviation Index (Burke and Dunlap
2002) suggested “acceptable” inter-rater agreement on artistic quality. If both researchers
rated differently, values were averaged.
5. The Oppenheim effect in peer-reviewing processes by scientific journals describes the
phenomenon that authors and not manuscripts are the major determinants of the quality of
submissions (Gorman 2007).
6. See the Online Appendix for detailed methods.
7. The critical assumption underlying models of proportional odds is verified by a test of
parallel lines that, with a p-value of 0.518, suggests a meaningful sequential order
underlying the dependent variable (reference category Y ¼ 5).
8. Dutch and Flemish arts funding systems have been transformed in recent years.
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